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Higher Order and Lower Order Variables in the Visual Perception
of Relative Pulling Force
Claire F. Michaels and Marc M. de Vries
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
In 7 experiments, undergraduates judged the force exerted by a videotaped standing puller, a
computer-generated (stick-figure) puller, or a computer-generated inverted pendulum. Single
and stepwise multiple regression analyses determined the kinematic variables exploited by the
participants. Results show that (a) judgments correlated highly with force and improved with
feedback; (b) judgments correlated more highly with lower order kinematic variables than
with force itself; (c) participants differed in the kinematic variables exploited; (d) participants
changed over blocks of trials in the variables exploited; (e) some participants used compound
kinematic variables; (f) the variables exploited depended on the type of feedback; and (g)
judgments to upright pullers, inverted pullers, and simple pendula showed the same qualitative
patterns. Implications for theories of direct perception, directed perception, and heuristics are
considered.
The experiments reported here grew out of an informal
observation made in the context of viewing movement
registrations of humans engaged in the stand-and-pull task
(e.g., Lee, Michaels, & Pai, 1990). In that task, pullers stand
erect, bimanually gripping a handle at elbow height, and
attempt to make brief horizontal pulls to specified peak
target forces without moving their feet and while holding
their forearms steady and parallel to the floor. In analyzing
the movement registrations in that experiment, we found
that we were good at estimating the target force from
looking at the kinematics of stick-figure reconstructions
created by connecting the successive joint markers (i.e.,
ankle, knee, hip, shoulder, elbow, and wrist). The research
reported in this article follows up on this informal observa-
tion. A more formal analysis of perceivers' abilities to
estimate the forces a body exerts on an unyielding environ-
mental support (or, equivalently, reactive forces that the
support exerts on a body) would be a useful addition to the
literature on the kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD)
and the perception of dynamics. The goal of our article was
to provide such an analysis.
The KSD principle holds that because kinematics (mo-
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tions) follow lawfully from kinetics1 (forces and masses),
information specifying kinematics thereby provides a basis
for perception of, or action with reference to, kinetics
(Runeson & Frykhotm, 1983). For the visual case, to which
we limit ourselves here, experimental evidence suggests that
individuals are indeed able to report a variety of mass- or
force-related properties such as relative masses of colliding
objects (Flynn, 1994; Runeson & Vedeler, 1993; Todd &
Warren, 1982), bounciness of balls (Warren, Kim, & Hus-
ney, 1987), and, with point-light kinematics, the activity in
which a person is involved (Johansson, 1973, 1976), the
identity and the gender of the acting person (Cutting &
Kozlowski, 1977; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977), lifted weight
(Bingham, 1993; Runeson & Frykholm, 1981), caught
weight (Henderson, Bush, & Stoffregen, 1993), and even
deceptive intention (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983).
Neither the optical specification of kinetics by kinematics
nor their perception is without limit. Absolute kinetic
variables are not specified optically. For example, because
acceleration is net force divided by mass, for the net force to
be known, mass must be known (either by virtue of
perception or memory). In the research on mass estimation
cited earlier, for example, observers were asked to make
relative mass judgments (which mass is heavier) of un-
known objects (Runeson & Vedeler, 1993; Todd & Warren,
1982); they can also make judgments about absolute weight
when made relative to an (average-sized) human lifter
(Bingham, 1993). However, even when the kinematics
specify the kinetics, perceivers can have difficulties; these
are most apparent in cases of angular motion, for example,
balls rolling down inclines (Gilden & Proffitt, 1989; Proffitt
& Gilden, 1989), in which mass distribution determines how
motions are affected by forces and torques. Indeed, Proffitt
and Gilden have observed that gyroscopes and tops, whose
1 In the remainder of this article, we use the term kinetics rather
than dynamics to avoid confusion with the various meanings of
dynamics.
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motions are based on the conservation of angular momen-
tum, are toys precisely because their behavior is unexpected.
How, when, and why these and related perceptual or
cognitive difficulties occur constitute a sizable body of
literature on "naive physics."
The KSD principle is explicitly about the availability of
information that specifies kinetics; it is not a theory of
perception (Runeson & Vedeler, 1993). Perceptual theories,
in turn, differ in their claims about how such information
might or might not be exploited; three theories are of interest
in this article. The direct perception view holds that percep-
tion is specific to information, that is, the perception of
kinetic property X entails the detection of a single (perhaps
compound) kinematic variable Filial specifies X (Turvey &
Shaw, 1978). The directed perception view holds that the
perception of X entails any of several variables that redun-
dantly specify X (Cutting, 1986, 1991). The heuristics view
holds that kinetics-specifying kinematics are not used but
that single, lower order variables, together with (often naive)
beliefs about mechanics, permit inferences about kinetics
(Gilden, 1991; Proffitt & Gilden, 1989).
As different as these theories appear to be at first blush, it
is not a simple matter to distinguish among them experimen-
tally. First, these descriptions are shorthand versions of what
accomplished perceivers do. Behind the direct (and directed)
perception versions are carefully articulated arguments
about the meaning of the term specification, the nature of
perceptual information, and a recognition of, if not emphasis
on, a role for perceptual learning. They are theories of what
perceivers do in normal (often well-learned) situations of
perceiving and acting. The heuristics view, on the other
hand, usually makes a negative case—that perceivers ought
not be able to accurately report certain properties. Proffitt
and Gilden (1989), for example, claimed that perceivers'
judgments are limited by the dimensionality of the informa-
tion they can detect (particle motions, but not extended body
motions) and by the quality of their (tacit) knowledge of
physics; therefore, heuristics that exploit single, simple, and
nonspecific cues are likely to be error prone.
Attempts to evaluate the theories have investigated whether
perception and actions reflect kinetics-specifying variables
or variables that do not specify kinetics. The perception of
ball bounciness, for example, has shown dependence on
lower order variables (Warren et al., 1987). Most of the
debate recently has been in me context of the colliding-balls
paradigm (Gilden & Proffitt, 1989, 1994; Proffitt & Gilden,
1989; Runeson, 1995; Runeson & Vedeler, 1993; Todd &
Warren, 1982). Much of the debate concerns methodology:
How does one best determine the point of subjective
equality? Should simulations or real events be used? Are
both pre- and postcolh'sion kinematics necessary? Do fail-
ures to detect kinetics occur precisely because researchers
do not present the kinematics to which smart mechanisms
are sensitive (Runeson & Vedeler, 1993)? Hecht (1996)
claimed that both the theories of direct perception2 and
heuristics are, because of various escape clauses, in fact not
falsifiable as general theories and therefore have "no
explanatory power whatsoever" (p. 65). Nevertheless, we
argue that one can attempt to determine what variable a
perceiver exploits, whether thai variable is the same over
observers, what determines the variables that are used, and
what the nature is of learning to perceive kinetics. Such was
the tack of our research. We were interested in pitting higher
order and lower order variables against one another to see
which would better predict participants' judgments. Al-
though answers to these questions are necessarily equivocal
with respect to the aforementioned theories, we hope to
show that they illuminate aspects of the debate and set the
stage for rethinking the concept of specification and the
nature of perceptual learning.
The ability of interest here, that of perceiving the force
exerted by (on) a human figure on (by) an unyielding
support, appears to require sensitivity to a higher order
kinematic variable. To describe such a variable in more
detail, we examine in the next section how force is created in
bimanual pulling and what geometric and kinematic (hereaf-
ter "kinematic") variables contribute to the specification of
force.
The Kinetics and Kinematics of Bimanual Pulling
Biomechanical and task constraints, along with a few
simplifying assumptions, locate the essentials of force
production in bimanual pulling in the horizontal motion of
the puller's center of mass, as given in Equation 1 (derived
in Appendix A, but see Michaels, Lee, & Pai, 1993, for a
more detailed derivation):




where F is the force; m is the puller's mass; g is the
acceleration attributable to gravity; X and CP are the
horizontal components of the distances from the ankle to the
center of mass and to the center of pressure, respectively; H
is the height of the center of mass; and X is the anterior
acceleration of the center of mass.
Michaels et al. (1993) showed that the center of mass
motions in this task could be modeled well as a three-
parameter inverted pendulum, as shown in Figure 1. We
briefly describe the model here because it provides a
shorthand description of the parameters of a pull and
because we used it to generate the simulated pulls in
Experiments 2-7. The inverted pendulum is in an Earth-
gravitational field and has a constant mass located at a fixed
radius (r) from its axis of rotation. The mass is connected to
a vertical support by an initially slack elastic cord of some
linear stiffness (K). In a pull, the center of pressure is
assumed to apply a constant torque about the axis of rotation
(the ankle), which, together with a torque caused by gravity,
accelerates the pendulum from the vertical. Assuming that
2 Hecht (1996) actually contrasted the kinematic specification of
dynamics with heuristics, but it is clear that he was not so much
concerned with whether kinetics were specified but with whether
they were directly perceived.
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the system behaves like a conservative system, the kinemat-
ics of the pendulum, given an initial upright position, are
uniquely determined by three parameters: (a) the constant
torque created by the gravitational force acting through the
distance from the ankle to die center of pressure (CP), (b)
the amount of slack in the cord (S), and (c) the stiffness of
the cord (K) according to Equation 2. This equation shows
the center of mass acceleration as a function of these three
critical parameters along with gravity, the puller's mass,
pendulum radius, and a term, W (defined as \jr2 - X2lr),
that relates angular to linear terms and that with real pullers
is always close to one:
25 r
X =
(X + CP) • g K • (X - S)
WW. (2)
Looking at the trajectories of the center of mass motions
with different values of the parameters (see Figure 2), we
can see how the kinematics follow from the kinetics. The
constant torque (CP) determines the acceleration of the
pendulum from the upright. As the pendulum rotates, the
torque caused by gravity increases, so the farther it rotates,
the more it is accelerated by gravity. The point at which the
pendulum starts to decelerate is determined by the slack of
the cord. The more slack in the cord, the farther the
pendulum will travel before it decelerates. Once the cord is
stretched, its stiffness determines how fast the pendulum
decelerates. Higher stiffness will result in a faster decelera-
tion. The torque created by the stretching of the cord
accelerates the pendulum so that it returns to the upright.
It is clear from Figure 2 that the lower order kinematic
variables—the center of mass displacement and veloc-
ity—do not specify force. The same displacement can occur
with different forces. Similarly, the peak velocity does not
specify force; the two curves peaking at the upper right have
the same peak velocity but different peak forces (689 vs. 523
N). It is a kinematic pattern that is unique to force. Equations
Figure 1. A schematic of the body and the inverted pendulum
model. The bob moves back, playing out the slack in the cord. The
cord is stretched and, according to its stiffness, exerts a force that







Figure 2. The center of mass trajectories for eight combinations
of torque, slack, and stiffness. Variations in torque (more precisely,
its moment arm, CP) affect how quickly the center of mass
accelerates from the upright, seen in the two curve segments,
dashed and solid, deviating at Time 0. Slack (5) determines how far
the center of mass goes before it starts to decelerate, as in the
differences between the bold and lighter lines. Stiffness (K)
determines how fast the center of mass decelerates once it begins to
do so, as seen in the difference between curves distinguished by
circles and squares. The numbers inset at the curve peaks represent
force.
relating force to kinematics could take several forms, and we
show later how ecological constraints affect these equations.
For now, we note simply that force is specified by a pattern
of the center of mass accelerations, which could be repre-
sented, for example, as a time series of velocities or of
displacements. If perceivers are sensitive to one of these
equivalent kinematic complexes, then they should be able to
make accurate estimates of relative force applied in the
system; such would be expected with direct perception of
kinetics.
In the experiments that follow, we asked perceivers to
make estimates of relative pulling force over a large range of
pulling forces. Single and multiple regression analyses were
then used to track down the variable or variables that
accounted for the systematic variance in judgments. We
were particularly interested in whether observers would
exploit lower order variables that do not, singly or in
combination, specify force or whether they would exploit a
kinematic complex that does specify force.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment we attempted to establish the
phenomenon. We examined how accurately perceivers could
estimate the relative pulling force exerted by a real human
puller attempting to pull to various percentages of maximal
pulling force and what kinematic variables perceivers ap-
peared to exploit.
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Method
Nine students from the Vrije Universiteit were paid a small fee
for their participation in the experiment. They viewed a videotape
depicting 250 bimanual pulls. For each pull they were asked to
estimate how hard the puller pulled as a percentage of her maximal
effort. If the puller appeared to pull half as hard as she could, they
were to respond 50%; if it was nine tenths, they were to respond
90%, and so on.
The puller, one of us, made a series of 50 bimanual pulls on a
handle attached with a chain to a force transducer. The puller was
standing erect with upper arms vertical and at her side and the
chain, handle, and wrist were all at elbow height. The target
percentages of the 50 pulls ranged from 5% to 95%, randomly
selected (with the condition that there were no gaps of more than
5%). The pulls were made in a random order. The achieved forces
ranged from 66 to 1,069 N and correlated well with the intended
forces (r = .95). The pulls were recorded on video at 40 Hz with a
single camera perpendicular to the puller's sagittal plane at a
distance that permitted a full view of the puller throughout the pull.
Four-second-long segments of each pull were rerecorded in five
blocks of 50 trials with the pulls copied in a random order in each
block. A 10-s intertrial interval separated each pull.
In the experiment proper, the participants viewed the tape on a
monitor controlled by computer. A pull was presented and the
participant entered his or her estimate of the relative pulling force
by keyboard in the 10-s interval. If the estimate was entered within
8 s, the tape continued. If the estimate had not yet been entered, the
recorder was paused by the computer and restarted on a signal from
the experimenter. The participant was given on-screen feedback of
the correct percentage, as determined from the recordings of the
force transducer, immediately on entry of the estimate.
The video was analyzed to determine the values of kinematic
variables. The positions of white markers over the ankle, knee, hip,
shoulder, elbow, and wrist in the video were digitized, along with
several reference points, and transformed to real-word coordinates.
Classical segmental analysis using mass distributions based on
average female anthropometry (Chaffin & Andersson, 1984) yielded
the vertical and anterior—posterior center of mass positions for each
video frame. The anterior-posterior coordinates were smoothed
with a low-pass cutoff frequency of 5 Hz, differentiated with
respect to time to yield velocities, and a second time to yield
accelerations. From these time series, the peaks of displacement,
velocity, and acceleration were determined for each pull.
Results and Discussion
We begin with an assessment of the extent to which
participants' estimates of peak force were consistent with the
actual peak forces. Correlation coefficients were determined
for each block of trials for each participant. These correla-
tions were uniformly high (.83 < r < .94) and there was a
significant increase3 in the correlations over blocks of trials,
F(4, 28) = 5.15, p < .005, suggesting that the feedback
aided in guiding participants' attention to force information.
As emphasized in the introduction, such correlations are
ambiguous; they might reflect sensitivity to a higher order
variable specifying force or the use of a good heuristic—
using a lower order variable or variables that correlate with
force. To determine whether a simple heuristic led to such
impressive correlations, we regressed judgments against two
kinematic variables: the maximal displacement of the pull-
er's center of mass (X) and the maximal velocity of the
center of mass (V).4 Correlations between judgments of
force and the two kinematic variables also were uniformly
high; correlations with X ranged from .81 to .93 and
correlations with V ranged from .84 to .96, with the V
correlation always nominally higher than the X correlation.
The critical question is, then, whether the correlations
between judgment and V are higher than those between
judgment and force. Their Z,s were subjected to a two-way
within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA), with vari-
able (force vs. V) and blocks as factors. The main effect of
blocks, F(4, 28) = 4.57, p < .01, showed the expected
increase in correlations over blocks. The main effect of
variable, F(3, 21) = 17.01, p < .005, revealed that the
average correlation for velocity was higher than that for
force. The interaction did not reach significance (F < 1).
Stepwise multiple regression analyses of judgments against
the X and V were carried out on all blocks of trials for all
participants. V was always the single significant predictor.
However, it also was the case that X and V were highly
correlated (.95), suggesting that even with these two vari-
ables, there is a daunting multicollinearity problem. In any
case, the data are consistent with the idea that all participants
used a velocity heuristic.5
One might wonder whether there is some other variable
that correlates even more highly with judgment. Is there
systematic variance that is not being accounted for (albeit
necessarily small because V is already accounting for 84%
of the variation in individual observations)? To test this, we
computed the correlations between judgments based on each
stimulus and the judgments on the same stimulus on the
previous block of trials. We reasoned that if there were
systematic variance in judgments that we were missing,
3 This and all subsequent tests of the significances of differences
among correlations were performed on the Z transformations of the
correlations rather than on the correlations themselves. Z, =
.5FX1 +(r)-ln(\ - r)].
4 Our original intention to use the center of mass acceleration as
an additional predictor had to be scrapped because of multicollinear-
ity between the variables; V accounted for 96% of the variability in
the peak acceleration. This or the related problem that X and V
together were multicollinear with acceleration precluded the use of
acceleration as a predictor in all of the experiments reported here.
Thus, there was ambiguity in our determination of the precise
kinematic variables that were exploited. Note, too, that the
bimanual pull arguably has only one degree of freedom (given
biomechanical and task constraints, the momentary center of mass
position is unique to one configuration of joint angles and
positions); as such, the single degree of freedom can be expressed
in a number of ways (e.g., hip position or knee angle).
5 It also is possible that the puller used a "velocity heuristic" to
produce the action. One can think of the pull as building up kinetic
energy, transferring that into potential energy of the elastic element
(muscles and tendons), and returning that potential to kinetic
energy to bring the body to the upright position. If the stiffness (K)
of the elastic element is constant over pulls, then the inertia!
component of the peak force will be proportional to the peak
velocity. In other words, posterior velocity (presumably specified
in the puller's optic flow) specifies upcoming force (see Michaels &
Lee, 1996, for details).
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correlations between judgments on successive trials would
be higher than (or as high as) the correlations between
judgments and the best kinematic predictors. If the system-
atic variance is accounted for by the predictors, the intertrial
correlations should be lower. The reasoning was as follows:
If a predictor correlates .8 with judgments on successive
trials, it accounts for 64% of the variance in each, so trial n
should predict only 64% of the (systematic) 64% of trialn +
1, which should lead to a correlation of .64. The observed
intertrial correlations turned out to be considerably lower
than other predictors, suggesting that systematic variation
was already accounted for.
All of the individual results are presented in Figure 3,
which gives the various R2 for the five aforementioned
predictor variables. We describe this figure in detail because
we report the results of other experiments in similar figures.
The squares show the Rh for the predictions based on the
previous block. As noted, these tended to be the lowest of the
lot, although they showed the most gain, revealing that
judgments became more consistent. The diamonds show the
R2s for force; as noted, these correlations were high, but
never the highest. The two kinematic predictors, X and V, are
shown as open circles and plus signs, respectively. These
appeared to differ somewhat among participants (e.g., X
seemed a poorer predictor for Participant 8). V was an
excellent predictor for all participants. Finally, the © shows
the /J2s for the multiple regression of judgment against X and
V. If there is only one significant predictor in a given graph,
then the multiple R2 equals (and overlaps) that predictor; if
the multiple R2 is higher than the other predictors, then both
V and X were significant predictors in the multiple regres-
sion. To be a significant predictor, a variable must add
significant predictive power beyond that of the first predic-
tor. Later in this article we show more interesting versions of
such graphs in which there were bigger differences among
variables and participants, and more changes among predic-
tors over blocks of trials.
Overall, it is clear that the judgments of force from
viewing a video of a real puller were more reflective of
lower order kinematic variables than of (a kinematic vari-
able specifying) force. A combination of variables could
have led to better performance; a regression of force against
the kinematic predictors (including acceleration) revealed
that a compound of acceleration and velocity was the best
predictor. However, participants did not or were not able to
discover that compound variable. This could be attributable
to any number of factors, such as insensitivity to accelera-
tion (cf. Calderone & Kaiser, 1989). Additionally, given the
high intercorrelations and the consequent high level of
performance that could be achieved using a single variable,
the information space was not sufficiently broad to permit
exploration. (The various intercorrelations among variables
are presented for all Experiments in Appendix B.) That is,
trying a different variable or combination of variables would
not yield a sufficiently differentiated feedback to encourage
change. It is interesting to speculate, in that regard, that dips
in performance on later blocks, although it might indicate
that the task was getting tedious, might also be attributable
to participants' attempts to scope out the kinematic land-
scape to find a variable that led to better performance.
Unfortunately, the task demand on the puller—to generate
accurate pulling forces—may have worked against creating
a rich landscape of kinematic variables. Namely, the smaller
the number of variables that the puller must control, the
more likely the achievement of accurate pulling force. On
these grounds, we decided to use computer simulations of
pulls in which a richer array of kinematic variables could be
created. We used this strategy in Experiments 2-6.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we used computer-generated stick
figures engaging in the stand-and-pull task. Our goal was to
decorrelate the kinematic variables to increase the chances
that participants would explore the information space and
perhaps discover a variable that specifies force. Obviously,
when participants viewed a real human puller, the use of a
velocity heuristic was either sufficient to generate gratifying
feedback, or, if it was not gratifying, there was little
guidance about what other variables or compounds would
improve performance. First, however, we decided to present
the stick figures without feedback to obtain a performance
baseline for comparison with subsequent experiments.
Although we sought to decorrelate the kinematic vari-
ables, we explicitly did not want to use arbitrary collections
of those variables, as has sometimes been done in gait
perception research (e.g., Todd, 1983). We agree with
Runeson (1994) and Bingham, Schmidt, and Rosenblum
(1995) that kinematic displays of (bio)dynamic events
ought to be tightly constrained by a (bio)dynamic model. To
this end, our simulations of the bimanual pull exploited
the empirically supported inverted pendulum model of the
task (Michaels et al, 1993), described briefly in the introduction.
Method
Twenty-seven stick-figure displays of a human engaging in the
stand-and-pull task (see Figure 4) were generated. The center of
mass motions were generated from the model presented in Equa-
tion 2. The factorial combination of three levels of the three
parameters (i.e., torque, slack, and stiffness) yielded 27 stimulus
displays. All variables were within the ranges observed by Michaels
and Lee (1996) for human pullers. The levels of torque were 2,
6, or 10 cm (multiplied by an assumed mass of 70 kg and a
gravitational acceleration of 9.8 m/s2); the levels of slack were 2,8,
and 12 cm; and the stiffnesses were 8, 12, and 18 kN/m. The
equation for the acceleration of the pendulum system (see Equation
2) was numerically iterated at intervals of 1 ms and the position of
the bob read out every 17 ms (the frame rate of the Silicon Graphics
display). (The center of mass motions in Figure 2 are those
generated for this experiment; the middle value of each parameter
was omitted in that figure.) In addition to the center of mass
positions, the program also computed peak force and the peak








Figure 3. R2s of the zero-order correlations of force judgments with actual force (diamonds), X
(open circles), V (plus signs), and judgment on the previous trial (squares) and of the multiple
correlations of force judgments regressed against both X and V (®) in Experiment 1, which used a
video display and feedback on actual force. If, on any block the o or + symbols for X and V,
respectively, are not visible, they are obscured by the multiple correlation (Mult.) symbol, ®. T =
trial; n — 1 indicates the previous block of trials.
displacements, velocities, and accelerations of the center of mass
that, although not depicted on the screen, were specified (under the
boundary conditions cited in Footnote 6) by the segment positions.
The positions of the knee, hip, and shoulder joints also were
computed for each center of mass position.6 The height of the stick
figure on the screen was 15.5 cm.
6 The one-to-one relation between the center of mass position
and joint positions assumes that the elbow and ankle do not move
and that the spine and head complex is rigid. The joint locations
were based on average human anthropometry (Chaffin & Anders-
son, 1984).
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Each trial consisted of three consecutive identical pulling cycles.
As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to estimate what
percentage a given pull was of the maximal pulling force that the
figure could exert. They were told that a maximal pull might or
might not occur among the displays that they were to rate. The
simulated range of forces, as indicated in Figure 2, was 991 to 140
N, a range of 7-1. Participants entered their estimates using a
computer keyboard. Eight students at the Vrije Universiteit were
given four trials each on the 27 stimuli in randomized blocks. No
feedback was given.
Results and Discussion
The battery of analyses described for Experiment 1 was
carried out on the data. The results are given in Figure 5. The
first remarkable outcome was that 3 of 8 participants (1, 2,
and 6) had no statistically significant predictors, including
their judgments on previous trials. Assuming that these
results were not the result of some untraceable computer
glitch, we must conclude that they simply did not understand
what was asked of diem. We found this odd because none of
the participants gave any indication that the task was
impossible, unnatural, or even difficult. Indeed, one of these
participants went so far as to ask whether he should take into
account that the little man had made so many pulls that he
must be getting tired.
Among the 5 participants whose estimates were system-
atic, we again found reliable correlations of judgments and
force, averaging .72 (note that the figure presents R2 rather
man r). However, it was again clear that Vand X tended to be
better predictors than either (a kinematic variable specify-
ing) force or judgment on the previous trial.
The multiple regression analyses showed that 3 partici-
pants (4, 5, and 8) had only X as a significant predictor (the
crossed circle depicting the multiple correlation overlaps the
open circle) and 1 participant (3) had only V as a significant
predictor. Participant 7 had both X and V as significant
predictors, at least on Blocks 2 and 3. As might be expected
with no feedback, a one-way within-subjects ANOVA showed
no significant improvement in correlations with judgment
and force over blocks of trials.
Figure 4. The stick-figure puller simulated in Experiments 2-5.
The three positions are the initial position, the final position for a
pull of intermediate center of mass displacement (which would also
be an intermediate position for a pull with greater center of mass
displacement), and the final position for the pull with maximal







Figure 5. K2s of the correlations for the various predictor
variables in Experiment 2, in which judgments were given to a stick
figure but in which no feedback was given. Mult. = multiple
correlation, V = plus signs, X = open circles, T = trial, and n — 1
indicates the previous block of trials.
As in Experiment 1, the nominal variable that participants
were supposed to estimate—force—correlated less highly
with judgments than lower order variables, which were
(merely) correlated with force, and different participants
appeared to rely on different variables. Both of these
observations are in clear violation of what one would expect
from direct perception of force (via a kinematic variable
specifying it). Instead, an explanation in terms of heuristics
seems in order. In addition, arguably, three heuristics were
observed, one based on velocity, one based on displacement,
and one based on both.
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Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we assessed the effects of feedback.
Holding out for the possibility of the direct perception of
force, we examined whether participants could learn to
detect a kinematic variable specifying force given the more
articulated feedback than was available in Experiment 1.
From a heuristics perspective, we examined whether such
feedback would permit participants to learn a more effective
heuristic. Note that possible heuristics are not equally
effective. Analyzing the collection of stimuli from Experi-
ment 2 (which also was used in this experiment), an X-based
heuristic can yield a correlation of judgment and force of
only .85 (the correlation of X and force), whereas a V-based
heuristic could yield a correlation with force of .95 (the
correlation of V and force). These values assume that the
predictor is perceived and judged errorlessly. A combined
strategy could correlate as high as .97 (the multiple correla-
tion of force predicted by X and V).
Method
Every trial consisted of two stimuli, a standard stimulus and a
test stimulus. The standard stimulus, which was the same in every
trial, showed a stick figure whose motions reflected a torque of 6,
stiffness of 12, and slack of 7 (the intermediate values of all
parameters) and was assigned the arbitrary value of 10 force units.
Participants were instructed to scale the force applied in the second
stimulus with respect to the standard. If twice as much force was
applied the participant's response should be 20, and if half as much
force was applied the response should be 5, and so on. Both the
standard and the test display consisted of three identical pulling
cycles. After the participant had entered his or her score on the
keyboard, the correct answer was displayed on the monitor and
then followed by the next trial. The experiment consisted of six
blocks in which the 27 stick-figure displays were presented in a
random order. The nine naive participants were paid a small fee.
Results and Discussion
Figure 6 shows the correlation plots for 8 of the 9
participants in Experiment 3. Casual comparison with the
results of Experiment 2 shows that performance was consid-
erably better. All the participants had high correlations with
force, and it is obvious that one or another of the predictors
could account for most of the variance in judgments.
Moreover, except for Block 3 for Participant 2, predictions
based on the previous trial were lower than for other
predictors, indicating that the predictors captured all the
systematicity in variance.
Although it was clear that some participants showed
improvement—and a one-way within-subjects ANOVA
showed that over subjects, the trend toward improvement in
force judgments over blocks was significant, F(5, 40) =
5.82, p < .001—it is also noteworthy that the judgment-
force correlations were already high on the first block of
trials. As high as the correlations with force were, however,
we again observed that they were never the highest; as in the
previous two experiments, it therefore appears that par-
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Figure 6. R*s of the correlations of force judgments with the
various predictor variables in Experiment 3, in which judgments
were given to a stick figure and in which feedback on actual force
was given. Mult. = multiple correlation, V = plus signs, X = open
circles, T = trial, and n — 1 indicates the previous block of trials.
As to which kinematic variables best predicted judg-
ments, we found differences both among and within partici-
pants. Participants 2 and 5 showed a continued reliance on
X; their V correlations were below the X correlations and the
multiple correlations sat reliably on the X correlations.
Participants 8 (not depicted in Figure 6) and 9 persevered
with V. The other participants all showed a shift over blocks
in the best predictors of their judgments. Participants 1, 4,
and 6 appeared to shift from X to V; Participant 3 shifted
from V alone to a VX strategy, wherein both variables
independently were significant factors in a multiple regression.
One might justifiably wonder whether the differences
trumpeted in the previous paragraph were real or simply
spurious shifts in the tangle of highly intercorrelated predic-
tors. First, when a multiple correlation is higher than the
individual predictor, it is necessarily significantly higher
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than the zero-order correlation. Second, differences between
zero-order correlations are subject to statistical testing (see
Cohen & Cohen, 1983, pp. 56~57).7 Of the 54 pairs (9
Participants X 6 Blocks) of X and V correlations, 25 were
significantly different at the .05 level and another six at the
.10 level. Participant 2, for example, for whom an X strategy
was claimed, showed a significant superiority of X over Von
four of the six blocks. Participant 9, for whom a V strategy
was claimed, also showed a significant V over X superiority
on four of the six. Participant 6, for whom a shift of strategy
was claimed, showed a significant X over V superiority on
Block 2, a significant V over X superiority on Block 5, and
both predictors were significant in the multiple regression on
Block 6. Thus, although not all differences that one might
note in Figure 6 are statistically significant, it is clear that
differences in strategy both between and within participants
are statistically reliable.
To summarize, our search for the direct perception of
force again came up empty-handed. To be sure, correlations
with force were high, but they were uniformly lower than to
kinematic predictors that were not specific to force. In that
sense, we concluded that participants appeared to use
heuristics; their judgments correlated most highly with
kinematic variables that, although correlated highly with
force, were not specific to it. Moreover, the heuristics were
not the same in all cases. Participants differed from one
another in the heuristics they exploited, and some
participants appeared to change heuristics over blocks of
trials.
Experiment 4
The display characteristics in the first three experiments
permitted a high level of performance even if participants
responded on the basis of single, lower order variables. This
was because there were high correlations both between peak
force and peak displacement and between peak force and
peak velocity. In the first experiment, basing force judg-
ments on X alone could yield a correlation of estimated and
actual force of .95; using V alone could yield a correlation of
.97. In Experiments 2 and 3 those correlations dropped, but
only marginally, to .85 and .95. (Participant 4's estimates in
Experiment 3 illustrate the nominal success that can be
achieved using displacement and velocity heuristics: Judg-
ments correlated .93 with X on the first block and .97 with V
on the fifth block; the corresponding correlations with force
were .76 and .95, respectively.) If one used a compound of
displacement and velocity, correlations of judgment and F
could be as high as .97. The high correlations between
kinematic variables and force are not necessary relation-
ships; with appropriate manipulation of torque, slack, and
stiffness, one could contrive collections of displays in which
peak velocity or peak displacement would be negatively
correlated with force. This may seem odd in that the
variables are related to each other by physical laws; it may
even seem odd to speak of correlations in the first place. The
correlations refer only to the relationship among variables
within a particular collection of displays. By analogy, in a set
of ball throws, one could nullify the expected relationship
between initial velocity and distance traveled by contriving
the projection angle to increase with velocity, even to the
point of establishing a negative correlation between velocity
and distance.
If one wanted to further hold out for the possibility of the
direct perception of force, one might argue that the partici-
pants did not come into the laboratory with their attention
educated to a kinematic variable specifying force, that by
virtue of the relations cited in the previous paragraph they
were able to achieve good enough performance using simple
variables. The question, of course, is whether a display set
contrived to minimize these correlations would influence the
variables that are used and perhaps even foster responsive-
ness to kinetics-specifying kinematics.
Experiment 4 made a step in this direction by contriving a
collection of displays that eliminated the correlation be-
tween X and force and substantially reduced the correlation
between V and force (to .74). If a participant uses only X in
judging force in this set of displays, then judgments will not
correlate with force, a fact presumably revealed through the
feedback. A similar situation holds for V; reliance on V
alone, although it would lead to moderate success in the task,
might yield sufficiently unsatisfying feedback to motivate an
exploration of the information landscape in which partici-
pants might find a kinematic variable that supports more
accurate performance.
Finally, and perhaps most important, removing the corre-
lation between X and force sets the stage for distinguishing
between the use of individual variables in combination and
the use of a compound variable. To appreciate the distinction
between combinations and compounds of variables, imagine
that two variables are both correlated with the to-be-
estimated property and are not correlated with each other. A
participant might detect the two variables independently,
and each variable might account for a certain percentage of
the variance in judgment, either on different trials or as a
weighted sum on an individual trial; this would be a
combination. Consider a second case, such as the situation
we are setting up in Experiment 4, in which one of the
variables (V) is correlated .74 with the to-be-perceived
property, force, and the other (X) is not correlated with
force. If a participant bases force judgments on V, the
maximal correlation that could be achieved between judg-
ments and force would be .74 (the correlation between Vand
force). If said participant simply added X as a separate
variable, no benefit would be gained because the correlation
of X and force is contrived to be zero. Imagine further that
the relations among X, V, and force are as shown in the upper
four curves of Figure 2 (viz. that given a particular V, the
larger the X the lower the force). If this compound of Vand X
were used, estimates could correlate as high as .99 with
force, which is the multiple correlation of force regressed
against both X and V. When V is partialed out, X becomes
informative; the compound of XV is greater than the sum of
7 Cohen and Cohen's (1983) book is highly recommended as an
informative, accessible, and even entertaining treatment of the uses
of multiple correlation and regression in the investigation of causal
relations.
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its parts. Thus, if participants show a combined dependence
on V and X and have high correlations with actual force, a
compound variable is implicated; X is valuable only in the
context of V.
The size of the judgment-force correlation is informative
about what variable is not being used. An X heuristic can
yield a maximum R^ that is not statistically above zero; a V
heuristic and a combination (V-plus-X) heuristic can yield a
maximum R2 that is not statistically above .552; and an
X-given-V heuristic can yield a maximum R2 that is not
statistically above .979. Thus, to the extent that any observed
judgment-force R* is above any of these values, that
heuristic is eliminated as a possibility on that block of trials.
Notice that this logic is subtly different from that in our
earlier experiments, in which we reasoned that certain high
correlations evidenced the use of particular strategies; here,
the observation of certain correlations precluded the use of
certain strategies.
Method
The basic technique was that used in Experiment 3. The center of
mass motions of the stick-figure display were based on the three
parameters: torque, slack, and stiffness. In this experiment, how-
ever, the slack parameter had only one level: 7 cm. Stiffness and
torque had five levels each (6,9,12,15,18 kN/m and moment arms
of 2,4,6,8,10 cm, respectively). In the resulting 25 displays, X and
force had a correlation of —.05 and V and force had a correlation
of .74.
A display with a stiffness of 12 kN/m and a torque arm of 6 cm
was used on all trials as the standard against which the other
displays were to be scaled. The 25 displays were presented six
times in completely randomized blocks. After each trial the
participant's estimate and the correct force (scaled in reference to
the standard of 10) were displayed on the monitor. There were nine
naive participants.
Results and Discussion
The individual correlations of estimated force with X, V,
force, and the previous trial, along with the multiple
correlation against X and V, are plotted according to
participants and blocks in Figure 7. Inspection of the figure
shows considerable differences among participants and
considerable changes over blocks of trials within partici-
pants. Note that the predictions based on the previous trial
were never the highest, suggesting that the analysis did not
neglect systematicity.
For 6 participants (1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9), the correlations
between judgment and force (indicated by the diamonds)
were high;8 2 participants (3 and 5) snowed moderate
correlations, and 1 participant (2) showed no significant
correlation. For those who did show a correlation, there was
considerable improvement, although Participant 6 began
with such a high correlation that there was little room for
improvement. Because the three (post hoc) groups of
participants (showing high, moderate, and no judgment-
force correlation) maintained a fairly coherent identity
across the various analyses, we do not describe the partici-
pants separately. First and most important, the sizes of the
correlations with force in each group necessarily precluded
the use of certain heuristics. We concluded that Participants
1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 did not use an X, V, or X-plus-V heuristic
because the R2s exceeded the .552 cutoff. Similarly, Partici-
pants 3 and 5 did not use the X heuristic because their R2s
exceeded the zero cutoff.
So we know what each set of participants did not use in
the way of a heuristic, but there are other imaginable
heuristics (e.g., based on acceleration), and there is the
possibility that the judgments were based on a kinematic
variable specifying force. Do we have reason to believe that
a force-specific variable was exploited, at least by some
participants? Our test of this in the previous experiments
emphasized the superiority of the lower level kinematic
predictors (X, V, and multiple XV) over actual force as a
predictor. In this experiment, we found correlations with
force that were close to being the best predictors for bom
Participants 4 and 7. In fact, the distinction between whether
these participants used a kinematic compound specifying
force or whether they used a heuristic of a kinematic
compound that "merely" correlated .989 with force (the
multiple correlation of force regressed against velocity and
displacement) seems to pale in importance. With such
results, proponents of the heuristics view and the direct
perception view can only bicker about the distinction
between specification and correlation; we return to this
slippery distinction later in the General Discussion section.
For now, we discuss the remainder of the results of this
experiment in heuristics terms.
Participants 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9, whose judgment-force
correlations excluded the X heuristic and the V heuristic,
showed both X and V as significant predictors in the multiple
regression analysis (on an average of five blocks per
participant). What is interesting about the XV compound was
that the partial correlation of X with force after velocity had
been partialed out was negative. That is, for a given peak
velocity, the further back the center of mass went, the lower
the force (see Figure 2). Obviously, this relation held for
Participants 1, 4,6, 7, 8, and 9 in this experiment.'
8 The correlations in this experiment and the two that follow
were not directly comparable with those of earlier experiments
because they used a more restricted range of variables (e.g., a ratio
of maximum to minimum force of 2.3:1) than earlier experiments
(e.g., 7:1 in Experiments 2 and 3). To illustrate the possible effect
of this range restriction, the correlation of judgment and
force including all participants on the last blocks of trials in
Experiment 3 was .89, whereas the correlation for that data set over
the more restricted range of values used in Experiment 4 was only
.74.
9 It is interesting to ask, in retrospect, whether the participants in
Experiment 3 also picked up on this relationship. Remember that in
Experiment 3 the zero-order correlation of Xand force was .85. Of
the 4 participants who had F-then-X as significant predictors, 3
showed negative partial correlations with X. The 4th participant
had a positive partial correlation; he used the "incorrect" strategy
of reporting larger forces for larger displacements, given a particu-
lar velocity, with a consequently lower success on force correla-
tions (Participant 5 in Figure 5). Relatedly, it is clear that one ought
not to speak about the VX strategy because there are different ways
that variables can contribute to judgment.
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Figure 7. /?2s of the correlations of force judgments with the various predictor variables in
Experiment 4, in which judgments were given to a stick figure whose kinematic variables were
artificially decorrelated and in which feedback on actual force was given. Mult. = multiple
correlation, V = plus signs, X = open circles, T = trial, and n — 1 indicates the previous block of
trials.
Participants 3 and 5, with moderate correlations of
judgment and force, began on Block 1 with X as the single
predictor; on later blocks, their single predictor was V. Their
initial reliance on X—useless with this collection of dis-
plays—gave way to reliance on the more useful but still
limited V. This explanation is consistent with the increasing
correlations of judgment and force over blocks. It is
interesting that the 2 participants showed fairly high but
decreasing zero-order correlations of X with judgment. It
may be that these participants were using both V and X
heuristics on different trials.
Participant 2 rounded out the range of strategies: He
persevered with his reliance on X, reliably giving higher
force estimates the larger the travel of the center of mass. He
did so even in the face of feedback that, of necessity, showed
no relation between his estimates and the "right" answers.
To the extent that V had a nonzero correlation with
judgment, it was by virtue of its .62 correlation with X.
In summary, Experiment 4 replicated several findings
from the previous experiments: (a) individual differences
among participants in the exploited kinematic variables; (b)
changes within participants in the variables that were
exploited; and (c) at least for some participants, a superiority
of lower order kinematic predictors over a force-specifying
variable. It also made two intriguing additions to that list.
First, participants appeared to be able to use compounds in
which a variable uncorrelated with the nominal variable
could nevertheless contribute to accuracy. Second, the
correlations of such "merely correlated" compounds could
get so high that one should wonder about the utility of the
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distinction between specification and correlation, and conse-
quently about the distinctions between theories of direct(ed)
perception vs. heuristics, at least in this context.
In the next three experiments, we tested some general
characteristics of the visual perception of force in the
stand-and-pull task. Our goal in these final experiments was
to determine the generality of the findings. In particular, we
assessed the effects of different kinds of feedback and
attempted to determine whether the observed results depend
on the use of a human form or whether the same kinds of
results would be found when participants were asked to
make force estimates about an analogous physical system.
Experiment 5
The participants in our experiments, as a rule, did not
appear to have come into our experiments as expert force
perceivers. Three participants in the no-feedback Experi-
ment 2 could have performed as well not looking at the
displays. Others showed great improvement over the course
of the experiment; they adapted their strategy or educated
their attention to kinematic variables that correlated more
highly with force. This learning suggests that feedback about
some other variable might be equally effective in changing
the variables that participants exploit in this task. In
particular, in Experiment 5 we determined what would
happen to participants' correlations when feedback was
based on X or V rather than on force.
Method
Two groups of 8 participants served as observers. Both groups
participated in an experiment that was similar to Experiment 4 with
two notable exceptions. In the first case, there was no mention of
force; instructions indicated that participants would view a stick
figure that moved in a certain pattern and that each pattern had a
certain value on the basis of a movement property or a collection of
movement properties. Their task was to indicate what that value
was on the basis of the feedback they received. The first, standard
stimulus had a value of 10, and participants were to scale the value
of the second stimulus with respect to the first.
Unlike in Experiment 4, participants were not given feedback
about force. One group was given feedback on the maximal
displacement of the center of mass of the stick figure, X, and the
second group was given feedback on the peak posterior velocity of
the center of mass, V. That is, the feedback given was the X (or V)
of the test stimulus divided by the X (or V) of the standard stimulus.
The stimuli, numbers of trials, and other details of the method
corresponded to Experiment 4.
Results and Discussion
The general pattern of correlations between judgment and
the various predictor variables for individual participants
and blocks for the X feedback and for the V feedback were
similar to those observed in Experiment 4. However, instead
of emphasizing the results of individual participants, our
primary concern is with the differences in performance that
accompany the different feedback conditions. To this end,
we performed a three-way ANOVA on the Z,s of the
zero-order correlations between judgment and the feedback
variables from this experiment and those of Experiment 4.
The between-subjects variable was feedback type (X, V, and
force), and the within-subjects variables were blocks of
trials and predictor (X, V, and force).
There were significant main effects of both blocks and
variable but not feedback type. However, all interactions
involving feedback type were significant. The essence of
these results can be seen in Figure 8, which shows the
second-order interaction of feedback type, variable, and
blocks, F(20, 220) = 8.80, p < .001. The biggest effects
emerged in the force and X correlations. The judgment-force
correlations tended to rise for force feedback, remained
steady for the V feedback, and dropped for X feedback,
whereas the judgment-.? correlations tended to rise for X
feedback, remained steady for the V feedback, and dropped
for the force feedback. Over blocks of trials, the correlations
between judgment and the fed-back variable tended to
increase.
We also were interested in the extent to which single
versus multiple predictors were found to be significant in the
multiple regression analyses. To analyze this, we counted
the number of times that just X, just V, and V-then-X showed
up as significant predictors in the individual participant by
block cells. The results are presented as percentages in Table
1. A chi-square analysis10 on the frequencies was significant,
X2(4, N = 138) = 37.33, p < .001. The results show that X
feedback tended to foster reliance on X, V feedback fostered
(or maintained) reliance on V, and force feedback fostered
usage of V-then-X. The percentages given in Table 1 are over
all blocks of trials; when the first blocks were removed, the
effect was even more striking.
The results of Experiment 5 were straightforward: The
variable that was fed back had a strong influence on the
variables, singly or collectively, that participants came to
exploit in making their judgments. This, together with the
results of Experiment 2, in which no feedback was given and
in which 3 participants revealed no systematicity and others
wandered along with little change in strategy and no
substantial improvement, revealed that the kinematic vari-
able that came to be exploited depended critically on the
implicit task demand created by the feedback. Most partici-
pants appeared to be flexible in the way they made judg-
ments about event characteristics.
Experiment 6
The primary reliance in the first four experiments on
lower order kinematic variables suggests that there may be
nothing special about the displays used—that the fact that
they represent a human figure engaged in a motor skill is
incidental. If participants can (learn to) rely on lower order
display characteristics of velocity and displacement, then
one might expect that any display of a point moving in
arbitrary ways might yield the sorts of results that were
10 Cells in which no predictor was significant or in which
X-then-Y was significant were few and were omitted from the
analysis because they compromised minimal expected values
necessary for the chi-square analysis.
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observed. In Experiments 6 and 7 we examined this question
by testing whether the same patterns of results would be
observed with the display inverted and with a simple
pendulum rather than a stick-figure human, respectively. The
testing of force perception with an inverted figure was
motivated by observations that inverted point-light displays
often do not evoke the immediate and compelling experi-
ence of biological motion that usually accompanies upright
displays (Pavlova, 1989; Sumi, 1984).
Method
Experiment 4 was repeated, but the stick figure was inverted. In
addition, participants were given the instructions from Experiment
5—no mention was made of force—and were told dial the figure
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Figure 8. A plot of the three-way interaction of feedback type,
predictor variable, and blocks of trials on the Z,s for the zero-order
correlations of judgment and predictor variables. The X and V
feedback conditions were from Experiment 5, and the force-
feedback condition was from Experiment 4.
Table 1
Percentages of Blocks Showing X, V, or V-Then-X as the
Significant Predictor in Multiple Regression Analyses of the


















ment was identical to Experiment 4 (including feedback on force).
Eight participants served as observers.
Results and Discussion
The predictor graphs of individual participants (see Figure
9) were comparable to those presented for Experiment 4.
They showed diversity in predictors among participants and
systematic changes of predictor within participants. Thus, it
appeared, at least qualitatively, that participants behaved
similarly in the inverted version of the force perception task
to the way they behaved in the upright version (Experiment
4). One also can ask whether the quality of the force
judgments was the same in the two experiments. We
compared the Z,s for the correlations of judgment and force
in the two experiments using a two-way ANOVA with
experiments as a between-subjects factor and blocks as a
within-subjects factor. The only significance was the ex-
pected main effect of blocks. This suggests that inversion
does not appear to affect force judgments about stick figures
in a stand-and-pull task.
Finally, a chi-square analysis examined the extent to
which different predictors turned up significant in the
inverted displays as opposed to upright ones (Experiment 4).
There was an effect when all blocks of trials were included,
X2(2, N = 100) = 7.03, p < .05; 2% of the blocks had X as
the single predictor, 40% of the blocks had V as the single
predictor, and 58% had V-then-X (compared with 17%, 27%,
and 56%, respectively, from the upright version), but the
difference was attributable to the higher proportion of Block
1 Xs in the upright condition. When Block 1 was ignored, the
difference between upright and inverted was not significant.
Again, there was no indication that the general patterns of
results observed in Experiments 1-5 were unique to an
upright human figure.
Experiment 7
The previous experiment suggests that the findings re-
ported so far are about the perception of kinetics in general,
not just the kinetics of human movement. If that is so, the
simulation of an inanimate kinetic event would be expected
to yield a similar set of results. This prediction was tested in
Experiment 7. We asked participants to estimate the force
applied to (or by) a simple inverted pendulum whose bob
moved along the same trajectory as the center of mass in the
previous experiments. We reasoned that if estimates derived
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Figure 9. R2s of the correlations of judgments with the various
predictor variables in Experiment 6, in which judgments were
given to an inverted stick-figure puller.
from the inverted pendulum yielded the same patterns of
results as the human figures, it would provide further
evidence of the generality of these effects.
Method
There were two conditions in the experiment; in one participants
were given no feedback, and in the other force feedback was given.
Twelve participants were paid for their participation. Four partici-
pants served in the no-feedback condition; 4 served in the feedback
condition; and 4 served in both conditions, the no-feedback
condition followed by the feedback condition. All were naive about
the purpose of the experiment. They were asked to estimate the
force exerted on an inverted pendulum. They did this by scaling a
display against a standard inverted pendulum.
An IBM computer was used to generate the visual stimuli. The
factorial combination of three levels each of torque, slack, and
stiffness yielded 27 stimulus displays. The levels of torque were 2,
6, or 10 cm (• mg); the levels of slack were 5,10, and 20 cm; and the
stiffnesses were 5, 10, and 20 kN/m. The equation for the
acceleration of the pendulum system (see Equation 2) was numeri-
cally iterated at intervals of 1 ms and the position of the bob read
out every 20 ms (the refresh rate of the monitor). In addition to
display parameters, the program computed the peak displacements,
velocities, accelerations of the bob, and forces. The length of the
pendulum plus bob on the screen was 8.4 cm; the cord was not
represented.
Every trial consisted of two stimuli: a standard stimulus and a
test stimulus. The standard stimulus, which was the same in every
trial, showed a pendulum with a torque of 6, a stiffness of 10, and a
slack of 5 and was assigned the arbitrary value of 10 force units.
Participants were instructed to scale the force applied in the second
stimulus with respect to the standard. Each stimulus was displayed
for 5 s, which comprised 2-6 cycles depending on the combination
of variables. Participants entered their estimates by keyboard. Four
trials were given on each display in a completely randomized order
in the no-feedback condition, and 5 trials were given in the
feedback condition. Note that the kinematics of the displays were
more like those used in Experiments 2 and 3 than those used in
Experiments 4-6, in that slack was manipulated; that is, X and V
were not artificially decorrelated (see Appendix B).
Results and Discussion
The correlations observed between judgments and the
various predictors are presented for the no-feedback condi-
tion in Figure 10 and the feedback condition in Figure 11.
Once again, we found the same family of effects observed
earlier: Performance appeared to be better in the feedback
conditions; judgments correlated more highly with lower
order kinematic variables than with (a kinematic variable
that specifies) force; individuals differed in the variables
with which their judgments correlated most highly, and the
variables with which judgments correlated most highly
changed within participants. Additionally, the multiple regres-
sion analyses revealed that 3 of the participants in the
feedback condition converged on the VX compound (Partici-
pants 1, 3, and 4 in Figure 11).
Although the inverted pendulum arguably yielded the
same pattern of results that were observed with the stick
figures, a comparison of Figure 11 with Figure 6 suggests
that estimates on forces with the inverted pendulum were
less reliable with respect to kinematics and less accurate
with respect to force. To examine this difference, we
combined the results of Experiments 2,3, and 7. A three-way
ANOVA (with stimulus type and feedback as between-
subjects variables and blocks as a within-subjects variable)
was performed on the Z^ for the correlations of judgment
and force. The results are presented in Figure 12. The
judgments on the stick figures were better than those on the
pendulum, F(l, 29) = 6.63, p < .02; judgments were better
with feedback, F(l, 29) = 18.77, p < .001; and judgments
improved over blocks, F(3, 87) = 7.50, p < .0002, although
the significant interaction between blocks and feedback
showed, not surprisingly, that improvement occurred only
with feedback, F(3, 87) = 4.62, p < .005.
In short, there appeared to be differences in the extent to
which participants could (learn to) estimate the kinetic
properties of the two types of events. A stick figure was
better than an inverted pendulum with comparable displace-
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merits, velocities, and accelerations. It was nevertheless the
case that participants could learn to estimate the force in an
admittedly unnatural display: an inverted pendulum that
accelerated backward under its own power (in addition to
gravity) and that was somehow jerked back to the vertical.
General Discussion
In seven experiments, participants estimated properties
depicted in kinematic displays. They were asked to estimate
the peak force exerted by (on) a real puller (Experiment 1), a
stick-figure puller (Experiments 2-4), and an inverted
pendulum (Experiment 7) and to estimate some unknown
characteristic in Experiments 5 and 6, in which they were
given feedback with respect to force, displacement, or
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Figure JO. R2s of the correlations of judgments of force applied
to an inverted pendulum with the various predictor variables in
Experiment 7 in the no-feedback condition. V = plus signs, X =
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Figure 11. S2s of the correlations of judgments of force applied to
an inverted pendulum with the various predictor variables in
Experiment 7 in the force-feedback condition.
or a center of mass location) that accelerated in a circular
trajectory, both under the influence of a constant torque and
an increasing torque caused by gravity. After traversing a
particular horizontal distance (slack), the locus came under
the influence of a spring that exerted a restoring force
proportional to its stretch. The values of torque, slack, and
stiffness were manipulated to yield arrays of 25 or 27
displays.
Overall, we conclude that participants did not show
sensitivity to a kinematic variable specifying force. Two
observations justify this conclusion: First, if participants had
been sensitive to such a variable, correlations of judgment
and force would have been at least as high as those for the
judgment and individual kinematic variables. However, the
estimations of force for all participants in all experiments,
except for 1 block for 1 participant, had lower correlations
with force itself than with kinematic variables (or com-




Figure 12. Average Z,s for correlations of judgment and force
with the inverted pendulum (P) and the stick figures (SF) either
with feedback (F) or with no feedback (NF) from Experiments 7,2,
and 3, respectively.
pounds) that were not specific to force. With the exception of
3 participants in Experiment 2 (whose successive estimates
on individual displays did not even correlate), we were able
to track down kinematic sources that correlated more highly
than force, even though in most of these experiments
feedback on force was given. The second observation that
denies usage of a kinematic variable specifying force was
the individual differences among participants. Individuals'
estimates appeared to be based on different variables, and
changes over blocks of trials indicated that participants
changed in the variables they exploited. The variables that
participants exploited depended critically on feedback. This
was evidenced first by the superiority of performance in
those experiments in which feedback was given. Second,
Experiment 5 (and its difference with Experiment 4) showed
that the nature of the feedback determined, for most
participants, which variable was exploited.11
Experiment 4 demonstrated that a variable that in and of
itself was of no intrinsic use (i.e., had no zero-order
correlation with force) could, as part of a compound with
another variable, contribute to the accuracy of force esti-
mates. We concluded in this instance that visual perception
of pulling force evidenced the use of a compound (but still
not force-specific) kinematic variable. Finally, Experiments
6 and 7 showed that the same pattern of results was observed
when the stick-figure display was inverted and when a
simple inverted pendulum was displayed. We interpreted
this to mean that the observed phenomena reside in the
general domain of the perception of kinetics per se and not
only in the domain of the kinetics of biological motion.
This is a broad smorgasbord of results. The findings,
together with the problem highlighted in the discussion of
Experiment 4 (viz. the questionable value of the distinction
between a kinematic variable that specified force and a
kinematic variable that correlated .989 with force), set the
stage for more nuance here than in the broad strokes of our
introduction. It puts four items on the agenda: considerations
of the (a) methodological implications and (b) possible
limitations of our findings, (c) an elaboration of the concept
of specificity, and (d) a view of perception and perceptual
learning consonant with that elaboration.
Methodological Issues
Our results highlight a number of methodological issues
for researchers who attempt to determine whether some
variable provides the basis for perceptions of (or actions on)
objects and events in the world. Many potential pitfalls have
been discussed elsewhere. The discovery that manipulation
of an informational variable has an effect on a dependent
variable is of minimal interest; one needs to show that the
quantitative change in the dependent variable is appropriate
to the quantitative change in the informational variable
(Michaels & Beek, 1995). Even when it is, the demonstra-
tion that the values of informational variables are appropri-
ate to some perception or action does not guarantee that that
variable was in fact used, as Tresilian (1993) emphasized
with respect to judgments of time to contact and tau.
Multiple regression analysis is no panacea for this problem;
indeed, its indiscriminate use is virtually guaranteed to turn
up spurious findings. Nevertheless, if one recognizes the
dangers, especially when predictor variables are highly
correlated, it does serve to narrow the field of probable
variables.
As to avoiding the dangers, we have said little about the
spadework done before regression analyses of judgments
began: determining the relations among the kinematic
variables and picking predictors. This includes ensuring that
linear, rather than curvilinear or logarithmic, fits best capture
the relations and eliminating (multi)collinear predictors. In
eliminating (multi)collinear predictors from a regression
analysis, however, one must not think that the problem of
highly correlated kinematic variables is solved. The chosen
predictor must stand in for its correlates. For example, in our
experiments, acceleration was collinear with the compound
of velocity and displacement; thus, a multiple correlation
implicating both X and V would result if acceleration itself
were the effective variable (see also Footnote 4). The
cautious reader may therefore insert after each named
variable or compound "and everything that is collinear with
it." However, one should not exaggerate the danger; mul-
tiple regression analyses are less susceptible to this problem
than ANOVAs. In general, one must be satisfied that
regression analyses can serve only to eliminate particular
variables rather than implicate them. The goal of this type of
research is not to determine the identity or implementation
of perceptual algorithms (e.g., the means by which V-then-X
or acceleration is detected), but to determine what proximal
patterns are exploited in a task. As such, the goal is to
11 To discourage the possible conclusion that participants cannot
judge force accurately without being trained to do so, we mention
the results of another small experiment: Four participants (staff
members in human movement science) were asked to estimate the
percentage of possible pulling force of the 50 pulls while they were
being taped for Experiment 1. Without feedback, individual
participants achieved judgment-force correlations of .85 <
r < .95.
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determine what Man (1981) termed the "computational
problem" that appears to be solved in satisfying task
demands. Determining how it is solved in terms of algo-
rithms and how algorithms are implemented in tissue are
tasks for network modelers and neuroscientists.
There also are a number of experimental design issues
separating multiple regression and ANOVA approaches to
investigating information-perception (or -action) dependen-
cies. For the former, one must contrive display sets to have
wide and well-populated ranges of predictor variables.
Indeed, our own are sometimes on the meager side; it is
recommended that one have at least 15 times as many
observations as the number of predictor variables for each
regression analysis (Cohen & Cohen, 1983); we had 50, 27,
and 25 observations for our two-predictor regressions. That
this holds for each multiple regression is especially burden-
some if one is interested in tracking the use of predictors
over the course of an experiment. It is equally important to
have a broad and dense range of the response variable,
which cannot be had with categorical judgments (e.g., which
of the two balls is heavier or which of the two pulls is
harder).
A final methodological note concerns the observation of
differences between and within participants in the kinematic
variables that best predicted their judgments. This finding
emphasizes the value of analyzing raw data, data that have
not been averaged over trials or participants. It is only with
unaveraged data that the sorts of effects we reported here
reveal themselves.
Limitations of Our Findings
In this section, we address the generalizability of the
current findings. Is it realistic to expect that the trends and
apparent principles revealed here will appear in other tasks?
Three aspects of our task are of concern. The first is that we
asked for numerical judgments. We tried to determine what
observable properties of the optic array informed partici-
pants by asking them to say numbers. Admittedly, this is not
in the spirit of the ecological ontology of perception and
action. The choice was a matter of convenience. First, had
we used an action as a measure of perception, we would
have been confronted by an analog of the problem that we
faced with perception, namely a host of observable action
variables—a "muscular array"—that might be controlled by
perceptual information. The problem of determining which
of many possible, and perhaps highly intercorrelated, action
variables is controlled mirrors the problem that we ad-
dressed, that of determining which of many possible percep-
tual variables is doing the controlling. The suggestion that
participants might be asked to exert a bimanual pull in
response to our displays is a possibility, but that strikes us as
just another version of magnitude scaling that does not
necessarily bring one closer to perception and action.
A second concern is that KSD experiments, including
ours, put participants in the position of being passive
recipients of information. Again, this is not in the spirit of
ecological emphases on exploration and obtained informa-
tion. At issue is whether the various findings are an artifact
of requiring participants to make do with the information
imposed on them. It may be that in other types of tasks in
which participants are free to explore and manipulate, they
might converge quickly and reliably on the same variable.
Even limiting the potential generality to the visual KSD
experiments, a third concern is the complex of high intercor-
relations of predictor variables and our arbitrary creation and
relaxation of constraints (elaborated in the next section) to
uncover what participants were doing. There is the possibil-
ity that we have unwittingly created the current array of
phenomena: the use of lower order variables, individual
differences, changing dependence on variables, and so on as
mere learned strategies of how to respond.
On the one hand, one could argue that the situation we
have created is so artificial that the results are generalizable
only to other patently arbitrary KSD situations. On the other
hand, the phenomena seem genuinely reliable; participants
demonstrated, but not uniformly, an ability to adapt them-
selves flexibly and well to these task demands. That suggests
to us that we may indeed have tapped a genuine form of
perceptual learning—what Gibson (1966) called "the educa-
tion of attention"—and in a way that lays it bare to careful
scrutiny. Thus, that the task is arbitrary may be a virtue
because it presents a paradigm for investigating the educa-
tion of attention. In the next two sections, we take this
assumption as our departure point and sketch out some
implications for the ecological concept of information and
for the debate among proponents of direct or directed
perception and heuristics.
Specificity Versus Correlation
The specificity of information is an ecological, rather than
logical or mathematical, concept. It is easy to lose sight of
this in a cursory reading of the KSD principle, which
emphasizes the natural law origins of kinematics and
underplays other constraints. Runeson (1988) borrowed
Barwise and Perry's (1983) term nomic constraints to
capture the fuller picture: "Nomic constraints include not
only universal laws of nature but also natural regularities
that are conditional in the sense that they apply locally or
when certain conditions prevail" (Runeson, 1988, p. 300).
Natural law and constraints are both, in Runeson's terms,
grantors of information. Runeson (1989; Runeson & Ve-
deler, 1993) used the term incomplete invariants to denote
invariants based, in part, on local constraints, although we
wonder whether any qualifier is needed, in that "complete
invariants" rely on "general characteristics of terrestrial
environments" (Runeson, 1989, p. 7). A few examples may
clarify how constraints grant information. That terrestrial
gravity is 9.8 m/s grants acceleration, ceteris paribus,
potential information about size and distance. That size is an
enduring characteristic for some objects grants tau, ceteris
paribus, potential information about time to contact. That
eye height is an enduring characteristic of animals, that
gravity prevails, and that the horizon is visible (or specified)
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grants texture gradients, ceteris paribus, information about
sizes and distances of objects.
The relevance of constraints to the present task is obvious
in our explicit attempts to decorrelate variables. In response
to excellent force estimation and highly intercorrelated
variables in both Experiments 1 and 3, we altered constraints
to lower the correlations among variables. At the end of our
discussion of Experiment 1, we noted that the task demand
on a puller to generate accurate force may constrain how
many variables are controlled in the production of a pull and
that that cramped the space of variables, permitting partici-
pants to "get away" with using only velocity. However, that
logic implicitly dismissed the possibility that constraints on
pull production are grantors of information and the positive
observation that participants exploited that constraint in
their judgment. In the ecology of real pulling, the observed
constraint of constant stiffness (Michaels & Lee, 1996)
grants Vthe status of information about force.
In short, in relaxing constraints on a real puller (Experi-
ment 1) to create the simulations of Experiment 2, we
reduced the information available. In adding a new con-
straint (constant slack) for the displays in Experiment 4, we
created the informative compound of V-then-X, and 5 of the
8 participants learned to exploit it. These three experiments
thereby differed in the potential information that they
offered. Therefore, it is not surprising that we found different
levels of performance, as shown in Figure 13.
These considerations do not adjudicate the problem of
whether specification or correlation provides the better
description of the relation between proximal patterns and
distal properties. However, the concept of information
entails not only that relation, but also a perceiver who might
pick it up, and a task to be accomplished. Within task
ecology, one might reserve the term specificity to refer to
whether the available information is such that task demands
can be satisfied, presumably to be determined a posteriori.
Correlations, then, become measures that are meaningful
only within a task, where they permit comparison of
variables and prediction of limitations on performance.
Perception and the Education of Attention
We began our experiments with the hope of adding to the
understanding of the perception of kinetics and the type of
theory that accounts for that perception. We began with three
contemporary candidates: direct perception, directed percep-
tion, and heuristics.12 The direct perception approach argues
that perceivers should show sensitivity to a kinematic
variable that specified force. We did not find that although
one could argue that our participants, if they had been given
more practice and feedback, might have been able to
discover or direct their attention to a kinematic variable
specifying force. However, it is clear that over the range of
trials mat we ran, up to 250, such sensitivity was not evident.
The notion that pulling force was directly perceived via
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Figure 13. Average correlations of judgment and force over
blocks of trials for Experiments 1, 3, and 4. One constraint on real
pulling, constant stiffness, was relaxed in Experiment 3. A different
(and unnatural) constraint, constant slack, was added in Experi-
ment 4. Performance therefore appeared to be related to how
closely the display constraints matched the constraints of real
pulling.
On the other hand, we found that judgments were tightly
bound to observable quantities in the visual array. It did not
seem that proximal stimulus variables disappeared into the
person, mixed with a muddied naive physics, were weighted
and transformed, to emerge as an unrecognizable ingredient
in a perceptual judgment. The behavior of individuals was
different but nonetheless lawful; the systematic variance in
perception was attributable to variation in proximal patterns.
Therefore, we emphasize that participants' reliance on lower
order variables does not necessarily imply an inferential
process. One can still hold an uncompromising relationship
between perception (or action) and the sensory variables that
are detected, their specification of physical properties of the
environment aside. People detect what they detect; it is the
scientist's intuitions about people's goals that turns that
12 One theoretical position that we have not aired here is
Brunswik's (1956) probabilistic functionalism. Many of Bruns-
wik's concerns were the same as our own. He sought to determine
the "ecological validity" of a proximal stimulus, which he
measured as the correlation between a proximal pattern and a distal
property, as in that between kinematic patterns and kinetics. He
tried to determine the "functional validity" of proximal patterns,
whether participants exploited them in accomplishing a task,
obviously what we have done in this research. One might even go
as far as to suggest that the use of a compound variable is what
Brunswik foresaw in his "lens model." We think, however, that the
parallels stop there. Brunswik's (1956) perceptual theory had
perceivers picking and choosing from among proximal variables,
assigning them different weights by virtue of relative frequencies
of association with the distal property. Instead, the position we
advocate is that perceivers reliably attend to and detect certain
variables to constrain their judgments and actions without making
further decisions, assigning weights, and so on. The "choice" is in
attention to a variable; thereafter perception is specific to that
variable. On some other occasion, a perceiver may attend to some
other variable, but it, too, will directly inform perception and
action.
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detection into inferences or, as Gibson (1966) noted with
respect to illusions, into perceptual errors.13
Given the construal of information as granted both by
natural law and by constraints (be they lawful or arbitrary),
every task has an "ecology." If the goal of perceptual
learning is the discovery of a perceptual variable that is
sufficient to satisfy the task demands on judgments or
actions in that ecology, our results may provide some insight
into the process by which access is gained to such variables.
It does not appear to be the case that a person stumbles onto
the proper variable and thereafter "directly perceives."
Instead, merely correlated variables appear to guide the
search for and come to be selected as integral parts of an
informational complex. Our results highlight the need for a
careful elaboration of the Gibsonian concepts of "the
education of attention" and "perceptual differentiation"
(Gibson, 1966) and implicate the use of lower order
variables in that process. Although it is beyond the scope of
this article to consider how education of attention to a
compound variable might be learned (or evolved), our
results yield the following speculations.
The role for the perceiver in the task is to become an
expert, insofar as motivation and causal support for expert
performance permits. As causal support, we include informa-
tion available for detection and smart perceptual devices
(Runeson, 1977) suitable for the detection of that informa-
tion. When a smart perceptual device exists (evolved or
learned) and the appropriate information is available and the
perceiver intends to perform, he or she will behave like an
expert.
The task ecology changes with changes in available
information. The perceiver will be inclined to explore the
information space until the task demands are met. Educating
attention also can involve the development of a smart
perceptual device. One can imagine, on first pass, a process
analogous to Bernstein's (1967) beginner's solution to the
degrees of freedom problem in coordinated action. Con-
fronted with a large number of motor elements to control, the
beginner freezes many and manipulates as few as possible,
yielding a stiff performance. When that simple version of the
action is mastered, the beginner successively relaxes con-
straints and incorporates additional degrees of freedom. A
"coordinative structure" (Turvey, 1977) is developed in
which many degrees of freedom come to be controlled as a
single unit. Similarly, the novice perceiver is confronted by a
plethora of possible perceptual variables to guide judgment
(or action); one is chosen (the others frozen out) and a
serviceable performance emerges. In time, additional vari-
ables may be successively introduced and a smart device
develops, a perceptual analog to a coordinative structure that
collects entities together so that they function as a single
unit: information. At various points in perceptual learning
and under various circumstances, individuals would behave
as if their perception were direct, directed, or based on
heuristics. However, the undercurrent is the same: Individu-
als educate their attention to useful information that permits
them to satisfy task demands given the ecology of the
situation.
13 The Gibsonian (Gibson, 1966) sword that undercuts the
argument from illusion also can be turned on the perception of
kinetics. If we think it is an act of hubris to declare that people are
in error when they report that the length of a line is different from
what a ruler measures, it also is an act of hubris to expect that
perceptual systems register kinetic properties, say, as measured by
force transducers. The alternative is to adopt a more humble stance
with respect to what perceivers are doing, behaving pragmatically
in a task setting, and let the chips fall where they may (cf. Shaw,
Turvey, & Mace, 1982; Warren, Kim, & Husney, 1987).
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Appendix A
The Inverted Pendulum Model
Here we summarize Che derivation of Equations 1 and 2, which
describe the center of mass motions in the stand-and-pull task and
their modeling as an inverted pendulum (from Michaels, Lee, &
Pai, 1993, Appendix B; their Appendix A, not summarized here,
captures the biomechanics of pulling in a four-segment model).
Equation A1 relates the net torque, TN, about the axis of rotation to
the torques associated with muscular forces about the ankle (7',,
assumed to be constant), gravity (rc), and the force of the pull







The equation for Ta shows that the anterior-posterior distance (X)
from the ankle to the center of mass is the moment arm of a torque
caused by the gravitational force. For TE, the cord is assumed to
exert a force linearly proportional to its stretch (X less the slack, S,
in the cord) and to its stiffness, K. The pulling force is only in the
horizontal direction, so its torque is a cosine function of the angle
of the pendulum, ®. TE is zero when X s S.
TN gives rise to an angular acceleration, which is computed by
dividing the torque by the moment of inertia of the pendulum (mr2,
where m and r are the pendulum mass and length, respectively) as
shown in Equation A4. The horizontal component (X) of that
angular acceleration is given in Equation A3:
TN = ®mr
2 (A4)
X = © - r c o s ® - r - © 2 - s i n © . (A5)
Given the values of & (< 15°) and the small angular velocities that
develop, the velocity term in Equation A5, r • ®2 • sin (0), can be









which is given in Equation 2 as W.
Appendix B





































mr2 = TA + mg • X - K • (X - S) • rcos 0.
(A6)
Treating ankle torque as a force (mg) acting through a moment arm,
CP (ankle to center of pressure), and simplifying, we end up with
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